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FLORIDA
CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW: CIRCUMSCRIBING

LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY IN THE ABSENCE OF A
CLEAR PROHIBITION
Bush v. Holmes, 919 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 2006)
Jason Marques*
The Opportunity Scholarship Program (OSP),' a state-funded, parentchoice voucher system, was designed to provide private school
scholarships to students enrolled in certain Florida public schools.' Upon
its enactment in 1999, Respondents assailed the OSP as facially defective
under both the state and federal constitutions.3 The trial court found the
program violative of article IX, § 1 of the Florida Constitution4 insofar as
the OSP utilized public school funds for the payment of private school
* To my parents, Anne and Joe Marques, for their constant encouragement, and to Jen for
her patience and support despite the miles between us.
1. Law ofMay 16,2002, ch. 2002-387, § 103,2002 Fla. Laws ch. 387 (codified as amended
at FLA. STAT. § 1002.38 (2005)), invalidatedby Bush v. Holmes (Holmes II1), 919 So. 2d 392 (Fla.
2006).
2. See § 1002.38(2)(a), (3). To qualify for treatment under the OSP, a student must have
attended or been assigned to attend during the prior year a public school that received a failing
performance grade in the prior year and two of the past four years. § 1002.38(2)(a). Such a student
may elect to enroll in a qualified private school program or a better performing public school in the
same or an adjacent district. § 1002.38(2)(b)(3). Eligible private schools are "subject to the
instruction, curriculum, and attendance criteria adopted by an appropriate nonpublic school
accrediting body and [are] academically accountable to the parent for meeting the educational
needs of the student." § 1002.38(4)(f).
3. See Bush v. Holmes (Holmes1), 767 So. 2d 668,671 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000). Respondents,
a group of parents and interest groups, alleged that the OSP violated article IX, § 1; article IX, § 6;
and article I, § 3 of the Florida Constitution. Id. The parents also raised a challenge under the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. Id. Article 1, § 3
of the Florida Constitution provides, in pertinent part: "No revenue of the state or any political
subdivision or agency thereof shall ever be taken from the public treasury directly or indirectly in
aid of any church, sect, or religious denomination or in aid of any sectarian institution." FLA.
CONST. art. 1,§ 3. Article IX, § 6 provides: "The income derived from the state school fund shall,
and the principle of the fund may, be appropriated, but only to the support and maintenance of free
public schools." FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 6.
4. Article IX, § l(a) provides, in pertinent part:
The education of children is a fundamental value of the people of the State of
Florida. It is, therefore, a paramount duty of the state to make adequate provision
for the education of all children residing within its borders. Adequate provision
shall be made by law for a uniform, efficient, safe, secure, and high quality system
of free public schools ....
FLA. CONST. art. IX, § I(a).
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tuition.' Finding no language that prohibited such appropriation, the
Florida First District Court of Appeal reversed.' Subsequent proceedings
invalidated the OSP on separate grounds,7 and a question was certified to
the Florida Supreme Court.8 Using maxims of statutory construction, the
court interpreted article IX, § l(a) to mandate that free education be
provided solely through the state public school system.9 Because the OSP
effectively diverted public funds to private institutions, the court HELD,
that the program frustrated public school uniformity, which is mandated
by the state constitution. 0
Article IX, § 1(a) of the Florida Constitution provides that "[i]t is... a
paramount duty of the state to make adequate provision for the education
of all children residing within its borders," and requires that "[a]dequate
provision.., be made by law for a uniform, efficient, safe, secure, and
high quality system of free public schools . ..

.""

When interpreting the

validity of legislative action upon such constitutional mandates, Florida
courts are bound to resolve "every doubt . . . in favor of.

constitutionality."' 2 As a result, legislation should not be invalidated unless
it clearly contravenes the constitution.13
In Taylor v. Dorsey, 4 the Florida Supreme Court noted that Florida's
constitution is a limitation on, not a grant of, state legislative power. 5 In
light of this principle, the court considered whether legislation could be

5. See Holmes I, 767 So. 2d at 672. Two other state voucher programs currently utilize
public funds for private scholarships. See Matthew I. Pinzur & Carol Marbin Miller, Vouchers'
FuturePut in Limbo, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 7,2006, at 1B. The McKay Scholarships, which provide
private-school vouchers for disabled students, and the Florida charter school system, are utilized
by over 100,000 students and are publicly funded. Id.
6. See Holmes I, 767 So. 2d at 673, 675.
7. See Bush v. Holmes (HolmesI), 886 So. 2d 340,344-47 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004)(en banc).
While the case was pending on remand, the United States Supreme Court decided Zelman v.
Simmons-Harris,536 U.S. 639(2002), which upheld a school voucher program against a challenge
to the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. Holmes II, 886 So. 2d at 345. As a result,
Respondents dismissed actions brought under both the federal Establishment Clause and article IX,
§ 6 of the Florida Constitution. Id. The trial court subsequently ruled that the OSP violated the "noaid" provision of article I, § 3, on the grounds that public funding of the voucher program provided
prohibited benefits to sectarian schools. Id. at 344.
8. Holmes II, 886 So. 2d at 344.
9. See Holmes III, 919 So. 2d 392, 406-07 (Fla. 2006).
10. Id.at412-13. Reviewing de novo, the instant court sidestepped the question of the OSP's
constitutionality under article I, § 3, finding that such a determination was unnecessary because the
program violated article IX, § l(a). Id. at 398-99.
11.
12.
716 (Fla.
13.
14.

FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1(a).
Taylor v. Dorsey, 19 So. 2d 876, 882 (Fla. 1944) (en banc) (citing Holton v. State, 9 So.
1891), and Campbell v. Skinner, 43 So. 874 (Fla. 1907)).
See id. at 881 (quoting Chapman v. Reddick, 25 So. 673, 677 (Fla. 1899)).
19 So. 2d 876 (Fla. 1944).

15. Id. at 881.
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abrogated by the judiciary in the absence of an express or implied
constitutional prohibition. 16 While acknowledging the utility of expressio
unius est exclusio alterius,17 the court found that this maxim should be
used only sparingly in constitutional interpretation." Where no prohibition
is clearly evident, the court reasoned, expansive judicial deference to the
legislature is appropriate. 9 Because the legislation in Taylor did not
violate the primary purpose behind the constitutional provision in question,
the court concluded that expressio unius was inapplicable.2 °
When presented an opportunity to disallow the public funding of
private school programs via expressio unius in Scavella v. School Board
of Dade County, Florida's highest court declined to do so.21 The primary
purpose behind § 1, according to Scavella, was the establishment of a right
to free public school education for all state residents.22 In Scavella, the
court considered the constitutionality of a statutory cap on public funds
used to subsidize the private schooling of special needs children. 23 The
court noted that although no specific case law declared the existence of a
right to free education, such is the "clear implication" of § 124 Analyzing
whether a cap might deprive students of this right, the court was compelled
to construe the legislation "so as to prevent its being rendered
unconstitutional., 25 Recognizing the legislature's authority to appropriate
school funds, the court held that such a limitation was constitutional only
to the extent that it did not violate any student's right to free education.26
Subsequent to its implicit approval of a public fund/private scholarship
system in Scavella, the Florida Supreme Court was asked to quantify the

16. See id.
17. "Expressio unius est exclusio alterius, or expressio unius, refers to a principle of
construction" that means that "the expression of one thing implies the exclusion of another."
Holmes IlI, 919 So. 2d 392, 407 (Fla. 2006).
18. Taylor, 19 So. 2dat 881.
19. Id. at 881-82. The court thus distinguished the application of expressio unius in
Weinberger v. Bd of Pub. Instruction, 112 So. 253 (Fla. 1927), as appropriate only where the
legislative enactment directly contradicts the primary purpose behind the constitutional provision.
Taylor, 19 So. 2d at 882.
20. Taylor, 19 So. 2d at 882.
21. Scavella v. Sch. Bd. of Dade County, 363 So. 2d 1095, 1097 (Fla. 1978).
22. See id.
at 1098. The education article in force at the time Scavella was decided provided,
in pertinent part, "for 'a uniform system of [f]ree public schools."' Id. at 1098 (quoting FLA.
CONST. art. IX, § 1 (1968) (amended 1998 and 2002). Thus, it differed from the present statute in
that it did not require that public schools be "efficient, safe, secure, and high quality." FLA. CONST.
art. IX, § 1. This formulation imposed a Category II duty on the legislature with respect to
education. See infra note 34 and accompanying text.
23. See Scavella, 363 So. 2d at 1097.
24. Id.at 1098.
25. Id.(citing Bonvento v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 194 So. 2d 605 (Fla. 1967)).
26. Id. at 1098-99.
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level of funding necessary to constitute "adequate provision" for education
in Coalitionfor Adequacy & Fairnessin School Funding,Inc. v. Chiles.2
The court stressed that determination of adequacy in the abstract was
impossible without inquiry into whether legislative appropriations had
fostered the required "uniform" system.28 Creation of ultimate standards
measuring uniformity, the court posited, was a task for the legislature.2 9 In
light of this deference, the court found that uniformity should not be
construed restrictively, but rather as a framework within which legislative
innovation is possible.3" The court noted that absent judicially measurable
standards, "the constitution has committed the determination of 'adequacy'
to the legislature."3 The court therefore declined the invitation to
announce such standards itself. 2
In light of amendments to the education article enacted post-Chiles,33
the instant court observed that Florida residents had charged the legislature
with a maximum duty.34 According to the instant court, this fortified

27. 680 So. 2d 400, 402 (Fla. 1996).
28. Id.at 406-07. Section 1(a), at the time Chileswas decided, was unchanged from the time
of Scavella. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. The court determined that in order to be
considered "adequate," the school system must also be "uniform." Chiles, 680 So. 2d at 406-07.
The court noted that, unlike adequacy, several attempts to define uniformity had been made in prior
cases. Id. at 406; see, e.g., Sch. Bd. of Escambia County v. State, 353 So. 2d 834, 838 (Fla. 1977)
("[A] uniform system results when the constituent parts, although unequal in number, operate
subject to a common plan or serve a common purpose."); State ex. rel. Clark v. Henderson, 188 So.
351, 352 (Fla. 1939) ("[A] uniform system ....shall be established upon principles that are of
uniform operation throughout the State and ...such system shall be liberally maintained.").
29. Chiles, 680 So. 2d at 406 (citing Florida Dep't of Educ. v. Glasser, 622 So. 2d 944 (Fla.
1993), in which the court declined to more specifically define uniformity, and holding that the
legislature should provide meaning to the phrase). The court also noted that the education mandate
was never expected to result in total equality across public school districts, because "[s]uch a goal
is clearly impossible on a practical level, and the constitution should not be read to require an
impossibility." Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at408.
32. See id.
33. In 1998, Florida citizens responded to the decision in Chiles by amending article IX,
§ 1(a) to reflect its present language. Holmes III, 919 So. 2d 392, 403 (Fla. 2006). In 2002, citizens
again amended the education article, approving one measure that set a maximum limit on class
sizes and another that mandated the provision of "a high quality pre-kindergarten learning
opportunity." Id. at 404-05 (quoting FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1(b)-(c)).
34. Id.at 404-06. The court in Chiles summarized a category system developed by scholars
to "measure the level of duty imposed on the.., legislature" by the state education clause. Chiles,
680 So. 2d at 405 n.7.
[A] Category I clause merely requires that a system of "free public schools" be
provided. A Category II clause imposes some minimum standard of quality that
the State must provide. A Category III clause requires "stronger and more specific
education mandate[s] and purpose preambles." And, a Category IV clause
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mandate also redefined the allowable legislative means of providing
adequate, uniform, and high quality public education.35 Specifically, the
instant court construed § l(a) to require that the education of Florida's
children be addressed solely through the vehicle of free public schools in
order for it to meet the uniformity requirement.36 Because the OSP funded
private institutions not subject to the same statutory requirements as the
public school system, 37 the instant court
concluded that the program
3
fostered an inherent lack of uniformity.
The instant court reasoned that failure to reference another system by
which the legislature could deliver on its mandate was clearly indicative
of the people's intent.39 Such a constitutional omission, the instant court
explained, served to limit state funding of education to the public school
system alone.4" Without acknowledging the lack of an express
constitutional prohibition, the instant court interpreted the use of the words
"'free public schools"' as impliedly forbidding diversion of public funds
to the private educational system.4 In so doing, the instant court
distinguished the legislation at issue in Taylor, reasoning that the
comprehensive § 1(a) served a broader purpose and was therefore more
amenable to interpretation via expressio unius.42
On the basis of disparate issues, the instant court dismissed
comparisons between the OSP and the special needs program addressed in
Scavella.43 To accomplish this, the instant court noted that in Scavella, the
public funding itself did not face a constitutional challenge." In addition,
the instant court drew a line between "special" and "routine" students,
stressing the inability of the former to receive an adequate education

imposes a maximum duty on the State to provide for education.
Id. (quoting Barbara J. Staros, School FinanceLitigation in Florida:A HistoricalAnalysis, 23
STETSON L. REv. 497, 498-99 (1994)). The instant court, after analysis of the current § 1(a), found
that it imposed a Category IV duty upon the legislature. Holmes III, 919 So. 2d at 404.
35. See id. at 406-07.
36. See id. at 407.
37. See id. at 409-10. Private schools are recognized and catalogued, but not regulated or
accredited, by the legislature. See id. at 409. As a result, private schools are not subject to state
public school standards for curricula and teacher qualifications. See id. at 409-10. For example,
public school teachers are required to obtain certification by the state and undergo a background
check. See id. at 410. Furthermore, the curriculum in public schools must conform to the "Sunshine
State Standards," which prescribe academic achievement. Id.
38. Id
39. See id. at 403-04.
40. See id. at 407.
41. See id. (quoting article IX, § 1(a) (emphasis omitted)).
42. Id. at 407-08.
43. Id. at411-12.
44. Id. at 412.
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without assistance due to the inferior resources of the public school
system.45 In making this distinction, the instant court attempted to allay
fears that its decision would have repercussions on other publicly-funded
special needs programs.'
By interpreting § 1(a) to circumscribe legislative authority, the instant
court diverged from established Florida constitutional doctrine.47 To justify
such action, the instant court opined that by strengthening the
constitutional mandate, Florida citizens fundamentally altered § l(a)'s
primary purpose, thereby negating any implicit approval of scholarship
programs akin to the OSP under previous versions of the education
article." The true intent of the people, the instant court reasoned, is thus
ultimately frustrated by the OSP's failure to conform to public school
standards.49
The instant court stressed that the public's demand for adequate,
free schooling encumbers the legislature with a
uniform, high quality
"paramount duty."50 It then drew the incongruous conclusion that despite
their great passion for this express mandate, the people intended to hamper
the legislature's ability to meet it by implying that a singular method be
used to the exclusion of all others.5 In addition, the instant court failed to
acknowledge the inherent feasibility of the inverse implication: that the
public, by declining to expressly prohibit the use of public funds for
private schooling, tacitly approved of such method of delivery. 2 This
45. See id.
at 411-12, 422 n.23 (Bell, J., dissenting).
46. See id. at 412 (majority opinion); supra note 5 and accompanying text.
47. See Taylor v. Dorsey, 19 So. 2d 876,881-82 (Fla. 1944). Florida case law is littered with
decisions articulating the balance of powers interplay between the people, the legislature, the courts
and the state constitution. See, e.g., Forsythe v. Longboat Key Beach Erosion Control Dist., 604
So. 2d 452, 454 (Fla. 1992) ("If a legislative enactment violates no constitutional provision or
principle it must be deemed its own sufficient and conclusive evidence of thejustice, propriety, and
policy of its passage. Courts have then no power to set it aside or evade its operation by forced and
unreasonable construction.") (quoting Van Pelt v. Hilliard, 78 So. 693,694-95 (Fla. 1918)); Greater
Loretta Improvement Ass'n v. State ex rel. Boone, 234 So. 2d 665,670 ("The courts should not and
must not annul, as contrary to the Constitution, a statute passed by the Legislature, unless it can be
said of the statute that it positively and certainly is opposed to the Constitution. This is
elementary."); Rivera-Cruz v. Gray, 104 So. 2d 501, 506 (Fla. 1958) (Terrell, C.J., concurring
specially) ("The Constitution is the people's document. They may bind the legislature within the
confines of democratic polity, but the legislature can limit the people only in the manner authorized
by the Constitution."); State v. Bd.Of Pub. Instruction for Dade County, 170 So. 602, 606 (Fla.
1936) ("The power of the Legislature is inherent, though it may be limited by the Constitution. The
Legislature, therefore, looks to the Constitution for limitations on its power, and if not found to
exist, its discretion reasonably exercised is the sole brake on the enactment of legislation.").
48. See Holmes I, 919 So. 2d at 403-04, 406-08.
49. See id. at 412; supra note 37 and accompanying text.
50. See Holmes Iff, 919 So. 2d at 404.
51. See id.at 406-07.
52. See id. at 415-16 (Bell, J.,
dissenting).
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inaction is telling, as Florida citizens enacted two education amendments
in the OSP's wake, thus unavailing themselves of ample opportunity to
decry public funding of vouchers. 3
Through dissection of the amendment passed in response to Chiles, the
instant court recast § 1(a)'s primary purpose. 4 The instant court reasoned
that the addition of the adjectives "'efficient, safe, secure, and high
quality"' amplified the purpose announced in Scavella by providing
standards for the assessment of "adequacy."55 The instant court therefore
justified its refusal to follow Taylor, and in turn, its use of expressio unius,
on the grounds that the OSP frustrates this higher standard.56 However,
absent an assertion that the OSP also violates the current § l(a)
requirements of efficiency, safety, security and quality, statutory algebra
nets a mandate which requires "[a]dequate provision ... for a uniform...
system of free public schools."57 With only uniformity at issue, there is no
functional difference between the education mandate governing the
funding program approved in Scavella and the one purportedly violated by
the OSP in the instant case.5 Thus, despite § 1(a)'s updated language, its
primary purpose as it pertains to the instant case has not changed from
Scavella, thus rendering expressio unius inapplicable.59
The instant court's interpretation of § 1(a) as a maximum-duty mandate
is therefore relevant only to the extent that the legislature is demonstrably
failing to meet the prescribed standards.' No evidence presented in the
instant case supports the conclusion that the diversion of funds from the
public school system will render it inadequate.6 In addition, the instant

53. See id. at 416 n.18; supra note 33 and accompanying text. In addition, another election
year passed in 2004, five full years after enactment, without Florida citizens taking any action to
curtail the operation of the OSP.
54. See Holmes III, 919 So. 2d 403-04.
55. Compare id. at 404, with Scavella v. Sch. Bd. of Dade County, 363 So. 2d 1095, 1098
(Fla. 1978). The instant court categorized the current mandate as imposing a Category IV duty. See
Holmes I, 919 So. 2d at 404.
56. See id. at 407-08.
57. See FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1(a); supra note 22 and accompanying text.
58. See Scavella, 363 So. 2d at 1098-99 (finding that while the statutory cap in question
limited the special needs program's funding, no evidence existed to show, "nor [did] the complaint
allege, that the maximum set by the school board is insufficient to provide appellants" with a free
education, as was their right); supra note 22 and accompanying text.
59. See Scavella, 363 So. 2d at 1098; Taylor v. Dorsey, 19 So. 2d 876, 882 (Fla. 1944).
60. See Holmes III, 919 So. 2d at 423-24 (Bell, J., dissenting).
61. See id. In the strictest sense, the diverted funds do not diminish the public school fund
at all, and thus could not reasonably be found to cause public school inadequacy by draining the
money available in that system. See Nathan A. Adams, IV, Pedigree of an Unusual Blaine
Amendment: Article I, Section 3 Interpretedand Implemented in FloridaEducation, 30 NOVA L.
REv. 1, 61 (2005) (indicating that OSP funds are technically generated from general revenue or
other income streams which do not intermingle with the school fund itself). It is also unlikely that
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case advanced no specific facts to support the conclusion that
nonuniformity, and thereby inadequacy, is rampant amongst private
schools funded by the OSP. 62 Had such a finding been made, the instant
court would certainly have been within its power to declare the OSP
unconstitutional as applied to those students receiving scholarships to
attend an "inadequate" private school. 63 As the case stands, the instant
court simply surmised that inadequacy is manifested by statutory
differences in regulations and uniformity between public and private
schools. 6 Because the OSP does not call for a remedy for such inequity,
the instant court assumed the program failed to meet the uniformity
mandate set forth in § l(a).65 Such an assumption, however, is nearly
identical to that which the Chiles court refused to entertain.66 The instant
court's blanket declaration that the OSP violated uniformity in the abstract
is thus inconsistent, as Chiles concluded that the determination of
uniformity67 is a matter of policy for the legislature.68

the issues of adequacy or diminution of funds were briefed by the parties, considering that the case
was certified to the Florida Supreme Court on separate grounds. See supra note 7 and
accompanying text. The Governor's office itself, which tasked an aide to redraft the OSP in
anticipation of an adverse decision, was preparing to "counter a ruling striking vouchers on churchstate issues," not one based on legislative constraint. S.V. Date, Governor's Power Can't Save
Vouchers, PALM BEACH POST, Jan. 7, 2006, at 7A.
62. See Holmes III, 919 So. 2d at 423-24 (Bell, J., dissenting). Again, the inverse implication
could easily be true: that qualified private schools vastly outperform the public school system
across the board. See, e.g., ANTHONY S. BRYK, VALERIE E. LEE & PETER B. HOLLAND, CATHOLIC
SCHOOLS AND THE COMMON GOOD (1993) (finding that Catholic schools have a positive effect on

achievement, especially in the case of disadvantaged students previously enrolled in the public
school system).
63. See, e.g., Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 801 N.E.2d 326, 340 (N.Y. 2003)
(holding that "New York City schoolchildren [were] not receiving [their] constitutionally-mandated
opportunity for a sound basic education," thus rendering the state school funding program
unconstitutional).
64. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
65. See Holmes III, 919 So. 2d at 409-10. Note that this defect could have been avoided by
more stringent requirements for participating private institutions, such as requiring private schools
to conform to Sunshine State Standards, as suggested by Florida Senator Jim King. See Date, supra
note 61.
66. See Coal. for Adequacy & Fairness in Sch. Funding, Inc. v. Chiles, 680 So. 2d 400,408
(Fla. 1996). The Chiles court not only shied away from making such assumptions about adequacy
(or lack thereof) in the abstract, but specifically called for a uniformity standard to be governed by
the legislature. See id.; supra note 28 and accompanying text. No evidence is presented that
nonpublic school accrediting bodies, as required by the OSP, will fail to ensure proper uniformity,
other than the instant court's anecdotal contention that such bodies "have 'widely variant quality
standards and program requirements."' Holmes 111, 919 So. 2d at 410 (quoting Florida Dep't
of Educ., Private School Accreditation, http://www.floridaschoolchoice.org/Information/
PrivateSchools/accreditation.asp (last visited Jan. 3, 2005); see supra note 2 and accompanying
text.
67. Such a determination would include, for example, whether qualified private schools
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The instant court's treatment of Scavella is similarly questionable
insofar as the instant decision differentiates between exceptional and
ordinary education-a distinction § 1(a) does not make.69 In drawing such
a line, the instant court suggests that "all children" means all children
except exceptional children,7" in the same opinion that interprets "system
of free public schools" to prohibit, by implication, a legislative program
which provides free private school education with the use of public
funds.7 The instant court's declaration that special needs voucher
programs will be unaffected thus rings hollow given the court's
construction of the constitutional text.72 Further, the instant court ignores
Scavella'smaxim of statutory interpretation by failing to construe the OSP
in such a way as to prevent rendering it unconstitutional.73 Though this
might have been easily accomplished by analogizing special needs
students with those disadvantaged by their enrollment in substandard
schools, the instant court chose instead to treat the groups as distinct.74
Sidestepping its charge to liberally interpret the OSP, the instant court
failed to resolve any doubt in favor of the program's constitutionality. 75 In
would be compared individually to the specific failing public school from which the student
transferred, the statewide school system as a whole, or evaluated as a separate system entirely.
68. See Chiles, 680 So. 2d at 408; see also City of Jacksonville v. Bowden, 64 So. 769, 772
(Fla. 1914) (" The courts have no veto power, and do not assume to regulate state policy; [rather],
they recognize and enforce the policy of the law as expressed in valid enactments, and decline to
enforce statutes only when to do so would violate organic law.") (citations omitted).
69. See Holmes 111, 919 So. 2d at 422 n.23 (Bell, J., dissenting).
It is nonsensical to hold that article IX allows the Legislature to fund education
outside the public school system when the public school system fails to uphold its
constitutional duty in regard to disabled students but prohibits it when that school
system fails to uphold the duty in regard to disadvantaged students.
Id.
70. See id. However, "all children" presumably includes disabled children. Id.
71. See id. at 406-08 (majority opinion).
72. See id. at 412. Both the McKay Scholarships and the charter school program, which
receive some level of public state funding, arguably divert public school resources to private
schools. See supranote 5. The exceptional students are also, despite the instant court's distinction,
obtaining a free education through a vehicle other than the public school system. See Scavella v.
Sch. Bd. of Dade County, 363 So. 2d 1095, 1099 (Fla. 1978).
73. See Scavella, 363 So. 2d at 1099.
74. See Holmes III, 919 So. 2d at 422 n.23 (Bell, J., dissenting).
75. See id. at 405 (majority opinion); see also Ball v. Branch, 16 So. 2d 524,525 (Fla. 1944)
(emphasizing "that if there is any reasonable theory upon which [the] validity [of legislation] can
be upheld it is the duty of the courts to resolve that theory in favor of its validity"). For example,
the instant court gave no weight to doubts about whether lack of uniformity actually existed,
whether the constitution actually prohibited the diversion of private funds, or whether the court's
own implicit approval of special needs-based voucher systems was inconsistent with its overall
holding. Holmes III, 919 So. 2d at 400-12.
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the absence of any clear prohibition against its enactment, precedent called
76
for the instant court to defer to the legislature's policy determinations
regarding public funding of school vouchers. Furthermore, without any
evidence that the OSP frustrated the people's mandate, the instant case was
arguably decided on the basis of policy rather than precedent."
An example of the constitutional system working to perfection is
embodied by Chiles7" and its progeny. In Chiles, the public school system
was challenged on the basis of adequacy, and the court found that it should
defer to the legislature in the absence of express constitutional standards.7 9
In response, the citizens of Florida passed an amendment which
specifically defined its expectations regarding the quality of public
schools."0 In the instant case, without a showing that any inherent
nonuniformity between public and private education is damaging to the
adequacy of Florida's public schools, validity of the legislature's actions
should fall on the shoulders of the citizens.8 ' As the people failed to voice
opposition through the constitution, the words of the legislature should
have been definitive.8 2 The court's own jurisprudence demanded as much.

76. See Taylor v. Dorsey, 19 So. 2d 876, 881 (Fla. 1944).
77. See Holmes III, 919 So. 2d at 422 n.23 (Bell, J., dissenting); see also Ball, 16 So. 2d at
525 ("Courts are never permitted to strike down an act of the Legislature because it fails to square
with their individual social or economic theories or what they deem to be sound public policy.").
78. See Coal. for Adequacy& Fairness in Sch. Funding v. Chiles, 680 So. 2d 400 (Fla. 1996).
79. See id. at 406-07.
80. See Holmes III, 919 So. 2d at 403.
81. See id. at 422 n.23 (Bell, J., dissenting).
82. See, e.g., Taylor v. Dorsey, 19 So. 2d 876, 881-82 (Fla. 1944) (deferring to the
legislature).
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